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As recognised by the 2010 Nobel prize, the study of market frictions has generated rich insights in many areas of
economics, especially macroeconomics, labour economics and monetary theory.1 In industrial organisation, analysis has
focussed on understanding how market frictions can create a source of market power by restricting consumers’ ability to
change suppliers. Two different forms of friction have been studied. One literature has considered the search costs that
consumers face in gathering information about alternative suppliers, while another literature has focussed on the
switching costs that consumers may incur as a direct result of changing suppliers. Examples of the latter include additional
effort, service disruption, reduced compatibility and lost loyalty discounts.2
Surprisingly, these two literatures have remained largely independent of each other. As a consequence, very little is
known about the potential differences or interactions between the two forms of friction. This is an important omission
because in many markets, consumers are often constrained by both search costs and switching costs. For example, in order
to change suppliers in a market for a ﬁnancial product or utility, consumers may have to ﬁrst spend time searching for
information about an alternative, before then incurring switching costs by completing the necessary paperwork. Indeed,
the importance of considering both forms of friction within the same market is highlighted by a number of competition
policy investigations, not least in the banking sector, where the UK and EU authorities remain concerned over both the
transparency of price information and difﬁculties within the switching process (OFT, 2009; EC, 2009).3ll rights reserved.
s/economics/laureates/.
more detailed reviews see Baye et al. (2006) on search costs and Klemperer (1995) or Farrell and
bile phone market where the regulator has recently introduced legislation to improve the switching
umers’ phone numbers to their new provider within one working day (in line with similar moves by
ncerns over the accessibility of price information (OFCOM, 2010). Other UK cases where both search
clude the investigations into extended warranties, storecards and payment protection insurance.
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switching costs in unison. It makes two contributions. The main contribution consists of the construction of an oligopoly
model where consumers can be constrained by both forms of friction. The model shows how subtle distinctions between
the two costs can provide important differences in their effects on consumer behaviour, competition and welfare. Indeed,
in most cases, the levels of competition and welfare are shown to be more sensitive to the level of search costs than the
level of switching costs. In relation to the concerns over European bank markets or indeed any other market, this ﬁnding
suggests that a policy intervention to reduce search costs may provide larger beneﬁts to competition and welfare than an
equivalent reduction in switching costs. Subject to their relative resource costs, government authorities may prefer
policies to improve consumers’ information rather than to ease the switching process.
As a secondary contribution, the paper then uses some results from the theoretical model to offer a simple empirical
methodology for simultaneously estimating measures of both costs. In contrast to most of the previous literature which
focuses on estimating only one of the costs (as reviewed in the next section), our methodology emphasises the potential
importance of accounting for both frictions. Indeed, by attributing any market imperfection to only one cost, we
demonstrate how some ‘single-cost’ measures can exhibit an upward bias.
The theoretical model is presented in Sections 4 and 5. It introduces search costs and switching costs into a version of
Perloff and Salop’s (1985) model of oligopoly with differentiated products. The market is assumed to be mature in the
sense that each consumer already faces costs of searching and switching away from their given supplier. In particular, at a
cost of c per ﬁrm, consumers can search ﬁrms sequentially in order to learn each ﬁrm’s price and their willingness to pay
for each ﬁrm’s product. After having stopped searching, each consumer must then decide whether to remain with their
existing supplier or to trade with a previously searched alternative ﬁrm for an extra switching cost, s. We present the
equilibrium of a game where ﬁrms select prices and consumers simultaneously select their search and switching
strategies. The equilibrium generalises the results of some standard models that consider only one cost, such as Wolinsky
(1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999).4
Section 6 then examines some comparative statics. We ﬁrst compare how the two costs affect the equilibrium price.
While a unit increase in either cost raises the equilibrium price, the paper shows that the underlying mechanisms differ
substantially. A rise in search costs deters consumers from starting to search beyond their existing ﬁrm and prompts
searching consumers to search fewer ﬁrms. A rise in switching costs also discourages consumers from initiating any search
activity, but it has no effect on the number of ﬁrms that searching consumers choose to search. Instead, a rise in switching costs
deters consumers that have searched the entire market from switching to an alternative ﬁrm. The paper demonstrates that
these mechanisms are so different that in most cases, search costs have the consistently more powerful effect on market power.
We then consider how the two costs affect welfare. This is more complex as changes in either cost affect not only the
equilibrium price but also consumers’ searching, switching and purchase decisions. However, the paper shows that whenever
search costs have the relatively larger effect on the equilibrium price, they also have the relatively larger impact on consumer
surplus, proﬁts and total welfare.
In Section 7, we investigate the robustness of the results in a number of regards. The most important of these concerns
the introduction of dynamic competition. While it is customary to think of switching costs in a dynamic setting, the main
model is static and focuses on a mature market. However, we argue that any dynamic effects are only likely to strengthen
our ﬁndings due to the following reasoning. Switching costs are, by deﬁnition, only active after a consumer has made an
initial market purchase. Consequently, it is well known that the introduction of dynamic competition often erodes the
anti-competitive effects of switching costs by inducing ﬁrms to compete ﬁercely for the future proﬁts of new consumers
that are yet to be locked-in (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). However, as later discussed, search costs are often active both
before and after an initial market purchase and so the anti-competitive effects of search costs are not eroded in the same
way and search costs remain the more welfare damaging.
Finally, Section 8 uses the model to present a quick methodology for simultaneously calculating some ‘back of the
envelope’ measures of both search and switching costs. This methodology builds on a useful feature of the theoretical
model where consumers differ in their expost equilibrium behaviour - a fraction of consumers do not search, a fraction of
consumers search and switch and a fraction of consumers search but refrain from switching. Using data from eight UK
markets, we then show how one can use some of these equilibrium restrictions with aggregate consumer survey data to
recover separate measures for the two costs.
2. Previous literature
Two previous papers have offered a theoretical analysis of search costs and switching costs. Schlesinger and von der
Schulenberg (1991) analyse a circular city model where a number of entrants are located evenly between some market
incumbents. Consumers must incur a search cost to discover an entrant’s price and then further incur a switching cost to
trade with the entrant. Their paper is substantially more restrictive than ours and fails to capture the full effects of the two4 The use of a framework with product differentiation prompts the existence of a pure-strategy price equilibrium and contrasts to the more
traditional search models of price dispersion (e.g. Stahl, 1989). Although similar results can also be produced in a price dispersion model, the chosen
framework is more suited to examining the effects of the two costs by providing a fuller analysis of consumers’ search behaviour. Related frameworks are
being used increasingly to study other issues including prominence (Armstrong et al., 2009) and advertising (Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2011).
C.M. Wilson / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1070–10861072costs in two respects. First, the circular model implies that consumers only consider purchasing from the entrant or the
incumbent adjacent to their location and thus rules out the possibility of incurring search costs across multiple ﬁrms.
Further, the model produces the unrealistic outcome that all consumers who search in equilibrium also decide to switch,
such that consumers artiﬁcially view the two costs as equivalent.5 Sturluson (2002) considers competition between an
entrant and an incumbent. Increases in search costs or switching costs are shown to raise prices but no direct comparison
of their relative effects is provided. Any potential results are also limited by the focus on a duopoly which minimises the
role of multiple searches, and by the fact that equilibrium existence requires a tight parameter condition. In contrast to
these papers, the richness of our model allows a detailed comparison of all the effects of the two frictions, and not just on
market competition, but also on welfare.
The empirical literature has received somewhat more previous attention. In addition to some studies that use reduced form
analysis to analyse both costs,6 several papers perform structural estimations of the actual value of either search costs (e.g.
Hong and Shum, 2006; Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest, 2008; Koulayev, 2010; De los Santos et al., forthcoming) or
switching costs (e.g. Shy, 2002; Kim et al., 2003; Shcherbakov, 2009). The closest of these to our empirical application is the
much-cited work by Shy (2002). Unlike the other papers which use more general estimation methodologies, Shy offers a ‘quick
and easy’ method for calculating the level of switching costs using only limited data on prices and market shares. In a similar
spirit, our empirical application offers a ‘quick and easy’ method that uses only aggregate consumer survey data. However, our
method is able to calculate measures for both search costs and switching costs.
In the previous literature, only Honka (2010) has simultaneously estimated the level of search costs and switching
costs.7 Using data on individual consumers’ past supplier, search behaviour and ﬁnal choice of supplier, Honka estimates
the actual levels of the two costs in the US auto insurance market. Her estimation methodology differs to ours and is far
more general. Indeed, like Shy (2002) our methodology relies on some restrictive underlying assumptions. However, our
method is simple to use and requires only minimal data. It is hoped that further work may build on our current strategy to
provide a richer estimation methodology that could be used as a practical measurement tool for competition authorities.
3. Deﬁnitions and distinctions
While previous papers appear to agree on the differences between search costs and switching costs, this section attempts to
offer a more formal distinction between the two costs. Farrell and Klemperer (2007, p. 1977) suggest ‘a consumer faces a
switching cost between sellers when an investment speciﬁc to his current seller must be duplicated for a new seller’. Search
costs could appear consistent with this deﬁnition. Indeed, in order to change suppliers, a consumer must ﬁrst incur search costs
in order to ﬁnd and/or process some necessary information about an alternative supplier. However, it is this informational role
that produces the key difference between search costs and switching costs. Speciﬁcally, it leads to ﬁve distinctions. While these
distinctions could be viewed as arbitrary, care is later taken to demonstrate the importance of each distinction on each of our
results. First, unlike switching costs, search costs cannot be incurred by a consumer who is already fully informed (Distinction
1). Second, a consumer is less informed when making a decision to incur search costs than when making a decision to incur
switching costs (Distinction 2). Third, unlike switching costs, search costs can be incurred without then choosing to switch
suppliers. That is, expenditure on search costs is a necessary, but not a sufﬁcient, condition for switching suppliers (Distinction
3). Fourth, this then implies that, unlike switching costs, a consumer can incur search costs more than once by searching across
multiple ﬁrms (Distinction 4). And ﬁnally, in a dynamic context, unlike switching costs that are only active after an initial
market purchase, search costs may be incurred both pre- and post-purchase (Distinction 5). For the purposes of this paper, the
two costs can therefore be deﬁned as follows.
Search costs are the costs incurred by a consumer in identifying a ﬁrm’s product and price, regardless of whether the
consumer then buys the product from the searched ﬁrm or not.
Switching costs are the costs incurred by a consumer in changing suppliers that do not act to improve the consumer’s
pre-purchase information.
Finally, while it is possible that ﬁrms may be able inﬂuence the level of search costs and switching costs in practice, our
later model will follow the tradition within the literatures by treating the two costs as exogenous. Like other standard
models, this implies that the costs of switching are best interpreted as exogenous forms of real social costs rather than as
contractual costs (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). For example, switching costs are best considered as those arising from
additional effort, service disruption or reduced compatibility, rather than from cancellation fees or lost loyalty beneﬁts.5 Using our latter terminology, these features limit the comparison of effects by minimising the impact of Distinctions 2, 3 and 4.
6 These date back to Calem and Mester (1995) who offered support for Ausubel’s (1991) assertion that price stickiness and supranormal proﬁts in the
credit card market could be explained by the existence of search costs and switching costs. Further contributions include Knittel (1997) who
demonstrates a positive relationship between price-cost margins and proxies for search costs and switching costs in the US telephone market, and
Giulietti et al. (2005) who show how proxies are negatively related to the propensity for consumers to switch in the UK gas market. In a different vein,
Giulietti et al. (2010) use observations of tariff dispersion within the UK electricity market to make some separate inferences about the trends of search
and switching costs over time.
7 While not providing simultaneous estimates, there are two other related papers. Dube´ et al. (2010) provide a clever money-metric estimate of
loyalty which they interpret as a switching cost rather than a search cost because it remains unaffected by the presence of in-store advertising, while
Moshkin and Shachar (2002) estimate that 71% of individuals’ television viewing patterns are more consistent with the existence of search costs rather
than switching costs.
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Let there be nZ2 ﬁrms that each sell a single good with zero production costs. A unit mass of consumers have a zero
outside option and each possess a unit demand for the market good. With quasi-linear preferences, let consumerm gain an
indirect utility (excluding any search or switching costs) of umi ¼ emipi if she chooses to buy from ﬁrm i at price pi, where
her ‘match value’, emi, is an independent draw from a distribution GðeÞ with positive density gðeÞ on ½e,e, where 0reoe.
The market is assumed to be mature in the sense that each consumer is already partially locked-in to their ‘local’ ﬁrm.
Each consumer is free to search and trade with their local ﬁrm but faces costs of searching and switching in regard to any
other ‘non-local’ ﬁrm. In line with standard search models (e.g. Stahl, 1989), the main model focuses on a symmetric
conﬁguration such that ð1=nÞ consumers are ‘local’ to each ﬁrm.8 More formally, if consumer m is local to ﬁrm i, she can
learn her match value and the price at ﬁrm i, femi, pig, at zero cost and is also free to trade with ﬁrm i. However, in order to
switch to any non-local ﬁrm jai, she must ﬁrst incur cZ0 to learn her match value at ﬁrm j and ﬁrm j’s price, femj, pjg, and
then further incur sZ0 if she still wishes to trade with ﬁrm j. Search is assumed to be sequential with costless recall.
Hence, consumer m is able to search any number of non-local ﬁrms one by one, incurring a cost of c each time, before
choosing whether to purchase from her local ﬁrm i or, for an extra cost of s, from a searched non-local ﬁrm jai.
A one-shot static game is considered where the players select the following strategies simultaneously. Firms each select
a single price, pi.
9 At the same time, consumers form conjectures about the ﬁrms’ pricing strategies and select their ‘search
to switch’ strategies. A ‘search to switch’ strategy must prescribe the extent to which the market will be searched, which
ﬁrms will be searched and which ﬁrm, if any, the consumer will trade with. As consumers will consider all non-local ﬁrms
as identical ex ante in any symmetric price equilibrium, they will remain indifferent over the choice of which non-local
ﬁrm(s) to search. Consequently, after observing their local ﬁrm’s offer, femi, pig, a ‘search to switch’ strategy will only need
to prescribe whether consumer m should start searching beyond her local ﬁrm (Step 1), when to stop searching amongst
non-local ﬁrms (Step 2) and which ﬁrm to then trade with (Step 3).
5. Equilibrium analysis
5.1. Optimal search to switch strategies
This section begins the equilibrium analysis by considering the optimal search to switch strategy for a given consumer.
For simplicity, we will assume that the consumer correctly conjectures that all her non-local ﬁrms set a price equal to the
symmetric equilibrium price, pn, such that pej ¼ pj ¼ pn 8jai. However, in order to help analyse ﬁrms’ subsequent pricing
decisions, no restrictions are placed on the price of the consumer’s local ﬁrm, pi.
To ease the exposition, it is ﬁrst worth recalling a well-known feature of the optimal strategy in the standard case
without switching costs. In particular, suppose a consumer has previously searched a number of non-local ﬁrms and that
her highest discovered non-local offer, ðepnÞ, exceeds both her outside option and her original local offer, maxf0,eipig.
Kohn and Shavell (1974) demonstrate that the consumer should then continue to search amongst any remaining
unsearched non-local ﬁrms only if her highest previously discovered match value, e, is less than a threshold level or
‘reservation utility’, bx, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 1. The reservation utility, bx, is the unique value of x that solves c¼ R ex ðexÞgðeÞ de.10
The derivation of this stopping rule is surprisingly simple. First, suppose that the number of remaining unsearched non-local
ﬁrms, b, equals one. The decision to further search then reduces to a comparison between the highest existing offer, ðepnÞ, and
the net beneﬁts of conducting a single search, where for a cost of c, a new offer of ðe0pnÞ can be discovered. If e04e, this new
offer will be preferred to the existing offer. However, if e0re, the consumer will optimally use her free recall to maintain the
existing offer. Using the notation x e for convenience, the consumer will therefore be indifferent over conducting the single
search when ðepnÞ ¼ cþ R ex ðe0pnÞgðe0Þ de0 þ R xe ðepnÞgðe0Þ de0. Through simpliﬁcation, this expression reduces to that used
in the deﬁnition for the reservation utility. On ﬁnding a match value lower (higher) than this reservation utility, it follows that
further search will be strictly optimal (suboptimal). One can then use an inductive argument to show that this stopping rule is
indeed optimal more generally for any larger number of remaining ﬁrms, bZ1.11
Lemma 1 will now show how the logic of this strategy can be extended to allow for positive switching costs. Intuitively,
the existence of switching costs implies that the decision of whether to further search will now depend upon whether the8 Asymmetric conﬁgurations and the impact of positive local search costs are considered in Section 7.
9 Dynamic effects and the possibility of price discrimination are discussed separately in Section 7.
10 Due to the assumption that cZ0, it must be that bxre . Further, if bxoe then search cannot be optimal and bx can be set equal to e without loss.
11 To show why the presented stopping rule is optimal more generally for bZ1, ﬁrst suppose b¼ 2. If eobx , it must remain optimal to search - if
search is optimal when b¼ 1 then it must also be optimal when b¼ 2. If eZbx , the presented stopping rule suggests stopping. If instead, the consumer
chose to search, it would be optimal to search only once. To understand why, note that after making one search, only one unsearched ﬁrm would remain
(b¼ 1) and, as the consumer would have a best match value of at least bx , it would be optimal to stop. Hence, the decision of whether to further search
when b¼ 2 is, in fact, only a decision between stopping immediately and making one more search, where the presented stopping rule has already been
shown to be optimal. This argument can then be expanded for higher levels of b.
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should now employ two different reservation utilities. The consumer should ﬁrst decide whether to search beyond her
local ﬁrm in Step 1 by comparing her local offer to a ‘local’ reservation utility, bxs. If the consumer decides to search, she
should then choose whether to further search amongst the non-local ﬁrms in Step 2 by comparing her best existing match
value with a second reservation utility, bx. Finally, after having chosen to stop searching or having searched the entire
market without stopping, the consumer will have discovered some number, J 2 ½0,n1, of non-local ﬁrm offers (indexed
by subscript j). The decision of which searched ﬁrm to trade with in Step 3 is trivial. The consumer should trade with the
ﬁrm offering the best deal net of switching costs, b¼maxfeipi,ejpnsg 8jai, as long as such a deal is preferred to the
outside option of zero.12
Lemma 1. Given a search cost, c, and switching cost, s, the optimal search to switch strategy consists of the following.
Step1: Refrain from searching any non-local ﬁrm if maxf0,eipigþpnZbxs, (or bxsoe). Otherwise search any unsearched
non-local ﬁrm.
Step2: Stop searching amongst the non-local ﬁrms only if some ﬁrm j is found such that ejZbx or if all ﬁrms have been
searched.
Step3: Having stopped searching, trade with the searched ﬁrm offering the best deal, b¼maxfeipi,ejpnsg 8jai, iff b40.
Otherwise take the zero outside option.
The derivation of Steps 1 and 2 is now discussed in detail. However, a consideration of their implications and the roles
played by Distinctions 1–4 is best left until we cover the comparative statics of the full model in Section 6.
First, consider Step 2. Having started a non-local search, Lemma 1 suggests that the consumer should stop searching on the
discovery of a non-local match value, e, that is greater than or equal to the reservation utility, bx. This implies that the marginal
decision to stop searching amongst non-local ﬁrms is, in fact, independent of the level of switching costs and equivalent to that
discussed above for the standard case without switching costs. To understand why, consider a consumer who has discovered
such a non-local match value eZbx. Now, in order to have reached Step 2, the consumer must have decided to initiate a non-
local search in Step 1, which required the consumer to have received a sufﬁciently low local offer, maxf0,eipigobxspn.
Consequently, the discovered match value, eZbx, must yield an offer, ðepnsÞ, that necessarily dominates the consumer’s local
offer and outside option, maxf0,eipig. Whether the consumer makes further non-local searches or not, she now knows that
she will never return to take her local offer or outside option and that instead, she will deﬁnitely trade with this or some other
non-local ﬁrm. This implies that the consumer will deﬁnitely incur switching costs and so the level of switching costs becomes
irrelevant in her marginal decision to further search. More formally, if the number of remaining unsearched non-local ﬁrms, b,
equals one, the consumer will be indifferent over whether to search the remaining non-local ﬁrm in order to discover some
offer, ðe0pnsÞ, when ðepnsÞ ¼cþ R ex ðe0pnsÞgðe0Þ de0 þ R xe ðepnsÞgðe0Þ de0. The level of switching costs, s, then drops
out and the expression reduces to the same reservation utility, bx, as that described in Deﬁnition 1. The consumer should then
optimally stop searching only on the discovery of a match value, eZbx, and otherwise keep searching. This logic can then be
extended for bZ1 using the inductive arguments described previously.
Let us now move back to the original decision of whether to initiate a non-local search in Step 1. In contrast to Step 2,
switching costs now become important because the consumer must compare between (i) collecting the existing local offer
(or outside option) which excludes switching costs, maxf0,eipig, and (ii) searching to discover some non-local offer(s)
which includes switching costs. Lemma 1 suggests that the consumer should not initiate a non-local search if her local
offer (or outside option), normalised for the expected difference between local and non-local prices, maxf0,eipigþpn, is
greater than or equal to a ‘local’ reservation utility, bxs. To understand why, ﬁrst suppose that b¼ 1 such that there is only
one (unsearched) non-local ﬁrm. If the consumer decides to initiate search she will incur c in order to discover a single
offer, denoted by ðe1pnsÞ. This new offer will only improve upon the local offer (and outside option) if
e14maxf0,eipigþpnþs. Denote x1 maxf0,eipigþpnþs. The consumer will then be indifferent when maxf0,eipig ¼
cþ R ex1 ðe1pnsÞgðe1Þ de1þ R x1e maxf0,eipiggðe1Þ de1. On simpliﬁcation this condition becomes c¼ R ex1 ðex1ÞgðeÞ de and
provides an expression for the local reservation utility, bx1. It will then be optimal to refrain from searching whenever
x1 maxf0,eipigþpnþsZbx1. However, as the expression for bx1 is identical to that used for bx in Deﬁnition 1, this stopping
rule can be re-stated to suggest that search is optimal whenever maxf0,eipigþpnZbxs, as in Lemma 1.13 Although
slightly more complicated, similar inductive arguments to those used previously can then be employed to show the
optimality of this step for bZ1.
5.2. Equilibrium pricing decisions
This section considers the ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decisions. As adopted in other recent search models (e.g. Armstrong
et al., 2009), attention is now focused on the uniform distribution to improve tractability and ease interpretation;12 To motivate his empirical analysis, Knittel (1997) also provides a theoretical description of consumers’ optimal behaviour under search and
switching costs. However, his analysis only goes as far as presenting the equivalent of our Step 1.
13 In parallel to footnote 10, the assumptions that c,sZ0 ensure bxsre . If bxsoe then search cannot be optimal and bx can be set equal to eþs
without loss.
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From Lemma 1, one can ﬁrst note that no consumer will wish to search in a symmetric price equilibrium (where pi ¼ pnÞ
when maxfe,pngZbxs. Without any consumer search, the ﬁrms will be able to sustain the monopoly price. To avoid this
less interesting possibility, we concentrate on the case where some positive fraction of consumers do search beyond their
local ﬁrm in equilibrium. This is ensured by Condition 1.
Condition 1. In equilibrium, maxfe,pngobxs.
Under this condition, one can establish the equilibrium price by ﬁrst deriving the residual demand for ﬁrm i. Given a
price of pi for ﬁrm i and a price of p
n for all other ﬁrms, the residual demand for ﬁrm i, Diðpi,pnÞ, is the sum of four
components, as denoted in (2). We will now discuss each component in turn for the case where the difference between pi
and pn is small14:
Diðpi,pnÞ ¼ FLiðpi,pnÞþFNLiðpi,pnÞþRLiðpi,pnÞþRNLiðpi,pnÞ ð2Þ
Firm i’s local fresh demand, FLiðpi,pnÞ, is described by (3). It derives from ﬁrm i’s ð1=nÞ local consumers who choose to
buy without searching elsewhere. Any given local consumer chooses not to make a non-local search if maxf0,eipigþ
pnZbxs and then opts to buy from ﬁrm i if eipi40. From Condition 1, the ﬁrst requirement always ensures the second,
and so such local consumers buy with Prðei4bxsþpipnÞ ¼ 1GðbxsþpipnÞ.
FLiðpi,pnÞ ¼ ð1=nÞ½1GðbxsþpipnÞ ð3Þ
Firm i’s non-local fresh demand, FNLiðpi,pnÞ, is presented in (4). It stems from the consumers who are not local to ﬁrm i
but choose to visit ﬁrm i during their search process and ﬁnd it optimal to stop and buy. The total number of visits to
ﬁrm i made by non-local consumers can be expressed as ð1=nÞ½GðbxsÞþGðbxsÞGðbxÞþ    þ GðbxsÞGðbxÞn2 ¼ ðGðbxsÞ=nÞ Pn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk. The probability of optimally stopping at ﬁrm i conditional on visiting, equals Prðei4bxþpipnÞ. It is then trivial
to show that having stopped at ﬁrm i it will then be optimal to buy from ﬁrm i:
FNLiðpi,pnÞ ¼
GðbxsÞ
n
Xn2
k ¼ 0
GðbxÞk  ð1GðbxþpipnÞÞ ð4Þ
In contrast to these two components of fresh demand, ﬁrm i’s return demand consists of consumers who start searching
but never ﬁnd an offer worth stopping for. They end up searching the entire market before then realising that ﬁrm i offered
the best deal and returning to buy from ﬁrm i. Depending upon whether such consumers are local or non-local to ﬁrm i,
this demand is denoted as local return demand, RLið:Þ, as expressed in (5), or non-local return demand, RNLið:Þ, as described
in (6). The formal derivation of these two terms is more complicated and is contained within Appendix A.
RLiðpi,pnÞ ¼
1
nðeeÞ
Z bx
maxfe ,pigþpnpi þ s
GðeÞn1de ð5Þ
RNLiðpi,pnÞ ¼
ðn1Þ
nðeeÞ
Z bx
maxfe ,pngþ s
GðeÞn2GðesÞ de ð6Þ
Given the residual demand function presented in (2)–(6), one can now explore the ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decisions
using the standard FOC, pn ¼Diðpn,pnÞ=D0iðpn,pnÞ, under the assumption of no proﬁtable large price deviations. Ruling out
such deviations to ensure equilibrium existence is hard to fully demonstrate in models such as these (see Appendix B for a
detailed discussion). However, Proposition 1 suggests that when it exists, the unique equilibrium price breaks down into
two possible cases, depending on the relative magnitude of pn and e. (Throughout the paper, all omitted proofs are
contained in Appendix C.)
Proposition 1. When a symmetric equilibrium exists, the equilibrium price is unique and is characterised by (7), where
IðpnreÞ ¼ 1 iff pnre and zero otherwise:
pn ¼ 1Gðmaxfe,p
ngÞGðmaxfe,pngþsÞn1
ðeeÞ1½1þGðbxsÞPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkIðpnreÞGðeþsÞn1 ð7Þ
In the ﬁrst case, when pnre, all consumers will, at least, be willing to purchase from their local ﬁrm and the market
will be covered. Each ﬁrm will then have an equilibrium demand, Diðpn,pnÞ, equal to ð1=nÞ and the price under market
coverage, pnC , will reduce to (8). Note that as market frictions tend to zero, such that bx and bxs tend to e, the equilibrium
price converges to ðeeÞ=n. This price corresponds to that found in Perloff and Salop (1985) and reﬂects the market power14 Larger price deviations can alter the form of residual demand and prevent the proﬁt function from being globally concave. This is later discussed
within the context of equilibrium existence in Appendix B.
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pnC ¼
1
ðeeÞ1½1þGðbxsÞPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkGðeþsÞn1 ð8Þ
In the second case, where pn4e, some consumers will fail to ﬁnd any offer worthy of purchase and the market can no
longer be covered. Having received a low local offer, a consumer will always begin to search and continue to search until
ﬁnding an attractive offer via Condition 1. However, even after searching the entire market, a consumer will not want to
purchase from any of the ﬁrms with probability, PrðeopnÞPrðeopnþsÞn1, such that each ﬁrm’s equilibrium demand now
reduces to ð1=nÞ½1GðpnÞGðpnþsÞn1. An explicit expression for the resulting equilibrium price, pnNC , is hard to obtain, but
the expression for the equilibrium price in (7) now collapses to the following equation:
pnNC ¼
1GðpnNCÞGðpnNCþsÞn1
ðeeÞ1½1þGðbxsÞPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk ð9Þ
Finally, before examining the comparative statics in detail, it is worth considering some special cases. First, if one sets
switching costs to zero, the price derived in (7) offers an original uniﬁcation of the equilibrium prices found in the search
models of Anderson and Renault (1999) and Wolinsky (1986) that assume market coverage and non-market coverage,
respectively. Second, by setting search costs to zero, such that bx ¼ e, the model collapses to a static analysis of switching
costs which shares some similar features to that used in some recent dynamic studies, such as Cabral (2008) and Dube´
et al. (2009).
6. Comparative statics
In this section, we examine the relative mechanisms by which changes in the level of search costs and switching costs
affect the equilibrium price and welfare. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 consider how the costs affect the equilibrium price under
non-market coverage and market coverage, respectively. Condition 1 is maintained throughout. Without it, ﬁrms can
sustain the monopoly price and increases in either cost will have no effect on the equilibrium price. Finally, Section 6.3
analyses the effects on welfare.
6.1. Non-market coverage
The case of non-market coverage is easiest to analyse. As a preliminary step, Proposition 2 ﬁrst conﬁrms that higher
levels of either friction prompt an increase in the equilibrium price.15
Proposition 2. The equilibrium price under non-market coverage, pnNC , is increasing in the level of search costs, c, for all nZ2
and increasing in the level of switching costs, s, for all n42, and for n¼ 2 if e40.
Of more interest are the different underlying mechanisms that generate such price effects. Proposition 3 now suggests
that the mechanisms by which search costs and switching costs affect competition are so different that their effects on the
equilibrium price can consistently differ in magnitude.
Proposition 3. Under non-market coverage, the marginal effect from an increase in search costs on the equilibrium price is
always larger than the marginal effect from an increase in switching costs.
To gain an understanding of Proposition 3, note that the sign of ð@pnNC=@cÞð@pnNC=@sÞ depends upon the sign of the sum of the
three expressions presented below. One can use the (static) Distinctions 1–4 to then provide an intuition for each expression
and show that each expression is positive, such that search costs always have the consistently larger marginal effect:
 p
n
NC
ðeeÞ GðbxsÞ @
Pn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk
@c
" #
 p
n
NC
ðeeÞ
Xn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk @GðbxsÞ@c  @GðbxsÞ@s
 
 @ð1Gðp
n
NCÞGðpnNCþsÞn1Þ
@s
ð10Þ
The ﬁrst expression relates to the effect of search costs on increasing the equilibrium price by reducing the extensiveness of
consumers’ non-local search activity. Holding constant the fraction of consumers who start searching, GðbxsÞ, an increase in the
cost of search prompts such consumers to search fewer non-local ﬁrms by decreasing the reservation utility, @bx=@co0. No such
effect is created by an increase in switching costs because we know from Lemma 1 that the marginal decision to make a further15 That is, apart from an odd special case when n¼ 2 and e ¼ 0 where an increase in switching costs has no effect on the price, as further explained
below.
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multiple suppliers (Distinction 4).
The second expression concerns the net impact of search costs relative to switching costs on increasing the equilibrium
price by deterring consumers from initiating any non-local search activity. Holding constant the extensiveness of any
search,
Pn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk, a rise in either cost reduces the fraction of consumers who actually begin to search, @GðbxsÞ=@co0 and
@GðbxsÞ=@so0. However, one can show that a unit rise in search costs deters consumers from initiating a non-local search
by more than a unit increase in switching costs, @GðbxsÞ=@co@GðbxsÞ=@so0. This difference is key and relates to a
combination of Distinctions 2 and 3. To best understand it, recall the expression for the net beneﬁts of a ﬁrst non-local
search, cþ R ex1 ðe1pnsÞgðe1Þ de1þ R x1e maxf0,eipiggðe1Þ de1. Within this expression, ﬁrst note that the consumer expects
to incur search costs with probability one, regardless of whether or not the discovered non-local offer is attractive. This
derives from the fact that the decision to incur search costs must be made when the consumer is relatively uninformed
(Distinction 2). Second, note, in contrast, that the consumer expects to incur switching costs only if the discovered offer is
attractive, which occurs with a probability less than one. This stems from the fact that the consumer is able to decide not
to switch after searching (Distinction 3). Hence, in evaluating whether or not to initiate a non-local search, the consumer
places a greater per-unit weight on search costs rather than on switching costs, and this makes them particularly powerful
in deterring non-local search activity and generating market power.
Finally, the last expression relates to the effect of an increase in switching costs on consumers that have searched the
entire market. An increase in switching costs makes such fully informed consumers less likely to switch to a non-local ﬁrm
and here, under non-market coverage, more likely to leave the market without making a purchase. This reduces each ﬁrm’s
demand, DiðpnNC ,pnNCÞ ¼ ð1=nÞ½1GðpnÞGðpnþsÞn1, and provides an incentive for each ﬁrm to actually lower their price, as
pn ¼Dið:Þ=D0ið:Þ, which further enhances the difference between @pnNC=@c and @pnNC=@s.16 An equivalent effect for search
costs does not exist due to the assumption that only switching costs are active when a consumer is fully informed
(Distinction 1).
As a simpliﬁed summary, we can see that the relative power of search costs largely derives from the following. A
consumer who searches beyond her local ﬁrm (i) must incur a search cost and yet may not choose to later incur a
switching cost (via Distinctions 2 and 3) and (ii) may choose to incur multiple search costs (via Distinction 4). Many
remaining results in the paper will build on this foundation intuition.6.2. Market coverage
We now move on to the setting of market coverage. The mechanisms by which search and switching costs affect the
equilibrium price are very similar to those under non-market coverage. Consequently, it can be shown again that the
equilibrium price is increasing in each friction.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium price under market coverage, pnC , is increasing in both the level of search costs, c, and the level of
switching costs, s, for all nZ2.
However, there is one difference in the mechanism regarding the effect of switching costs on deterring fully informed
consumers from trading with non-local ﬁrms. Under non-market coverage, this made such consumers more likely to exit
the market and gave ﬁrms an incentive to decrease their price. Now, under market coverage, this makes such consumers
more inclined to purchase from their local ﬁrm and gives ﬁrms an incentive to increase their price. This change in
mechanism makes any difference in magnitude between the marginal effects of search costs and switching costs less stark.
However, Proposition 5 shows that search costs will continue to have the larger marginal effect on price if the number of
ﬁrms, n, is sufﬁciently large.
Proposition 5. Under market coverage, the marginal effect of search costs on the equilibrium price is always larger than the
marginal effect of switching costs when the number of ﬁrms is greater than or equal to four.
When there are two or three ﬁrms, either cost can have the larger marginal effect. However, when the number of ﬁrms
is larger, search costs have the consistently bigger impact on market power. Intuitively, this follows from two effects. First,
as the number of options grows, consumers that have searched the entire market become more price sensitive and are less
affected by the loyalty-inducing effects of switching costs. Second, an increase in the number of ﬁrms tilts the relative
composition of each ﬁrms’ demand towards non-local consumers and enhances the effects of search costs on deterring the
initiation and extensiveness of any search activity.16 From Proposition 2, we know that this price-decreasing effect of switching costs is dominated by its price-increasing effect on deterring non-local
search in all but one case. There, when n¼ 2 and e ¼ 0, the two effects exactly offset each other such that an increase in switching costs has no effect on
the price.
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In most cases, search costs appear to be the relatively more powerful determinant of market power. To be able to
provide better policy advice, this subsection considers their relative effects on welfare. We now state Proposition 6, which
applies to both the cases of non-market coverage and market coverage.
Proposition 6. If the marginal effect from an increase in search costs on price is larger than the marginal effect from an increase in
switching costs, @pn=@c4@pn=@s, then, relative to a unit increase in switching costs, a unit increase in search costs generates a greater
reduction in aggregate consumer surplus, CS, a greater decrease in total welfare, W, and a greater increase in industry proﬁts, P.
Proposition 6 can be explained as follows. First, consider industry proﬁts, deﬁned as P¼ pnDðpn,pnÞ where Dðpn,pnÞ ¼
ð1Gðmaxfe,pngÞÞGðmaxfe,pngþsÞn1. If switching costs have the relatively weaker effect on the equilibrium price then they
must also have the relatively weaker effect on industry proﬁts because, unlike an increase in search costs which leaves the
market size unchanged, @Dðpn,pnÞ=@c¼ 0, an increase in switching costs can also reduce the size of the market, @Dðpn,pnÞ=@sr0.
The effects on aggregate consumer surplus are more complex. Consider a marginal increase in switching costs. This will
affect consumer surplus directly in two ways. It will (i) increase the price paid by existing buyers and (ii) increase the cost of
switching to existing switchers. If one denotes the number of existing switchers as Ks such that the aggregate cost of switching
across all switchers is sKs, then a marginal increase in switching costs will reduce aggregate consumer surplus directly by an
amount, Dðpn,pnÞ  ð@pn=@sÞþKs. Further, by using the results of Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we also know that an increase in switching
costs will affect aggregate consumer surplus indirectly by changing consumers’ behaviour. In particular, while an increase in
switching costs will have no effect on the extensiveness of consumers’ search activity, it will (iii) decrease the number of
consumers who choose to search beyond their local ﬁrm, via a reduction in the local reservation utility, bxs, and (iv) deter
some consumers that have searched the entire market from switching to a non-local supplier.
With the application of an envelope-style argument, related to that used in Armstrong et al’s (2009, Proposition 3) search
model, we now claim that effects (iii) and (iv) have no (ﬁrst-order) impact. Consider effect (iii). For a small increase in switching
costs to prompt a consumer to stop searching beyond her local ﬁrm, the consumer must have been previously on the decision
margin – being exactly indifferent between the payoffs from buying from her local ﬁrm without searching and the expected
payoffs from initiating a non-local search – otherwise the consumer would continue to search. Hence, on average, an increase
in switching costs will have no (ﬁrst-order) impact on such a consumer’s surplus. Similarly, in effect (iv), for a small increase in
switching costs to prompt a fully informed consumer to refrain from switching to a non-local supplier, the consumer must have
been previously indifferent between the payoffs from switching and the payoffs from exiting the market or returning to her
local ﬁrm. This leaves only the direct effects (i) and (ii) and allows us to state that @CS=@s¼Dðpn,pnÞ½@pn=@sKs.
A similar argument can be used in respect to an increase in search costs. By denoting Kc as the aggregate number of
non-local searches made by all consumers, it follows that @CS=@c¼Dðpn,pnÞ½@pn=@cKc. The only direct effects from an
increase in search costs on aggregate consumer surplus are an increase in price for existing buyers and an increase in the
cost of each existing search. There is no (ﬁrst-order) impact from other effects that prompt some consumers to make fewer
searches because these consumers will have previously been on a decision margin.
This implies that ð@CS=@cÞð@CS=@sÞ ¼ Dðpn,pnÞ½@pn=@c@pn=@sðKcKsÞ. Hence, search costs will deﬁnitely provide the
relatively larger marginal effect on aggregate consumer surplus whenever @pn=@c4@pn=@s, if the total number of non-local
searches, Kc , is equal to or larger than the total number of switches, Ks. The proof in the appendix demonstrates that this is
always true in equilibrium. The reasoning is simple. Kc is always strictly larger than Ks due to a combination of Distinctions
2–4 – not all searching consumers may switch and/or some switching consumers may search more than one ﬁrm.
Finally, one can use similar arguments to show that search costs also provide the relatively larger marginal effect on
total welfare. As the loss in consumer surplus from an increased price for existing buyers is appropriated by ﬁrms in
industry proﬁts, the only (ﬁrst-order) effects on total welfare stem from the increased cost of existing search and switching
activity, such that @W=@c¼Kc and @W=@s¼Ks. Proposition 6 then follows from above as Kc4Ks.
To summarise, Propositions 2– 6 suggest that in most cases, search costs have the more powerful marginal effect of
market power, proﬁts, consumer surplus and total welfare. These results have practical implications. First, government
authorities may wish to focus their limited resources on reducing search costs rather than switching costs. Regardless of
the levels of the two costs, our results suggest that the beneﬁts from a unit reduction in search costs will often outweigh
the beneﬁts from a unit reduction in switching costs. While the authorities’ optimal decision will also depend upon the
associated resource costs of each policy intervention, this implies that authorities may prefer to improve, say, the provision
of consumer information rather than legislating to ease the switching process. Second, the results also suggest that
industries that wish to (collusively) increase market proﬁts may prefer to focus their attempts on increasing market-level
search costs rather than switching costs. Under this logic, industry agreements to curb levels of informative advertising
may appear particularly potent. Competition authorities should be watchful for such strategies.
7. Extensions
This section now investigates the robustness of the results by presenting a variety of extensions. Most importantly, we
ﬁrst consider the introduction of dynamic effects. We then investigate the possibility of costly local search, asymmetric
consumer locations, price discrimination and switching without searching.
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In order to provide a clear analysis of the subtle differences between the two frictions, the model has deliberately
neglected any consideration of dynamic competition. However, we expect that it would only strengthen the ﬁndings. To
illustrate, consider a two-period version of the model where each consumer enters the market in period 1 with no
switching costs, makes an initial purchase at some ﬁrm and then ﬁnds it costly to switch away from that ﬁrm in period 2.
In effect, our model has only analysed period 2, where ﬁrms have an incentive to exploit or ‘harvest’ their locked-in (local)
consumers. Now consider period 1. If the ﬁrms are myopic and do not consider the impact of their period 1 decisions on
their period 2 proﬁts, then it is clear that the comparative statics would remain consistent with our original model. If,
instead, the ﬁrms are forward-looking, then the comparative statics are likely to be strengthened. To understand why, note
that the introduction of dynamic competition often erodes the anti-competitiveness of switching costs by prompting ﬁrms
to lower their initial (period 1) prices in order to ‘invest’ in market share and earn higher future ‘lock-in’ proﬁts (in period
2) (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). However, with the use of Distinction 5 which suggests that search costs are active not
just after an initial market purchase (in period 2) but also beforehand when consumers ﬁrst enter a market (in period 1),
we can argue that the anti-competitive effects of search costs will not be eroded in such a way. Unlike switching costs,
search costs will create an upward pressure on prices in both period 1 and period 2 and so they will continue to provide
the more powerful effects on welfare.
7.2. Costly local search
It was originally assumed that consumers could search their local ﬁrms without cost. We will no show that the
introduction of costly local search makes no difference to the pricing equilibrium and actually strengthens the comparative
static results on welfare. If a local search now costs the same as a non-local search, c40, a consumer’s decision to enter the
market is no longer trivial. The consumer must choose between (i) staying out of the market to receive the zero outside
option, (ii) making a ﬁrst search to their local ﬁrm to discover an offer with expected value, EðeiÞpn and (iii) making a ﬁrst
search to a non-local ﬁrm to discover an expected offer, EðejÞpns. Option (iii) is dominated. However, if the consumer
chooses to search its local ﬁrm, the local offer will only be attractive relative to the outside option if ei4pn. By letting
x pn, we know that the consumer will then be indifferent between options (i) and (ii) when 0¼cþ R ex ðeixÞgðeiÞ dei. The
value of x that solves this expression, bx, coincides with the deﬁnition for the standard reservation utility in Deﬁnition 1.
Searching the local ﬁrm will then be optimal whenever xobx or equivalently, when 0obxpn. However, this condition is
always satisﬁed through Condition 1: maxfe,pngobxs, and so all consumers will always make a ﬁrst search to their local
ﬁrm as observed in the main model. It then follows that the equilibrium pricing equilibrium remains unchanged. However,
any increase in the level of search costs will now generate additional reductions in consumer surplus and total welfare by
increasing the cost of existing local searches, such that the welfare-damaging effects of search costs are further enhanced
relative to switching costs.
7.3. Asymmetric consumer locations
As in standard search models, the basic model assumed that each ﬁrm was endowed with a symmetric share of local
consumers. However, in practice, it may be the case that all consumers are local to the same ﬁrm. For example, after a
monopoly market has been liberalised all consumers may face costs of search and switching away from the incumbent. To
show how our results are robust in such a setting, consider an equilibrium where the incumbent, say Firm 1, sets a price,
pn1, and where the ðn1Þ entrants, with no local consumers, each set some price, pn2. To offset the additional complexity, we
focus on the case where n is large. Proposition 7 follows.
Proposition 7. Consider the incumbent model with n-1 and c40. Then, relative to a unit increase in switching costs, a unit
increase in search costs generates a larger increase in equilibrium prices and industry proﬁts, and a greater reduction in consumer
surplus and total welfare.
To understand why the incumbent’s price and the entrants’ prices are more sensitive to search costs rather than switching
costs, note that when n is large, any consumer who searches beyond the incumbent will always ﬁnd an attractive non-local
offer and never return to the incumbent. This makes Distinction 1 inactive. Now consider the incumbent’s choice of price. Its
demand derives solely from consumers that wish to buy without starting a non-local search. From previous results, we know
that an increase in search costs provides the relatively stronger effect in deterring consumers from starting such a search via
Distinctions 2 and 3. Consequently, an increase in search costs will provide the relatively stronger effect in raising the
incumbent’s price. To consider the entrants’ price, note that each entrant’s demand derives solely from consumers that started
to search beyond the incumbent and decided to stop after visiting the entrant. A rise in search costs deters consumers from
pursuing further non-local searches and allows each entrant to increase its price. However, a rise in switching costs has no such
effect on the incentives to further search via Distinction 4 and so leaves entrants’ prices unchanged. Finally, having conﬁrmed
the relative effects on prices, the relative effects on welfare can also be established using similar arguments to those used in
Proposition 6.
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Contrary to the original model, it is sometimes possible for ﬁrms to discriminate between their local and non-local
consumers. We will now demonstrate that our results remain robust when any ﬁrm i can set a price, piL, to its local
consumers and a price, piNL, to its non-local consumers. To offset the added complexity, we again focus on the case where n
is large. Within this setting, it is also possible to allow a very general conﬁguration of consumer locations, where ﬁrm i has
a proportion of local consumers equal to ai, such that
Pn
i ¼ 1 ai ¼ 1.
Proposition 8. Consider the price discrimination model with n-1 and c40. Then, relative to a unit increase in switching
costs, a unit increase in search costs generates a larger increase in equilibrium prices and industry proﬁts, and a greater reduction
in consumer surplus and total welfare.
The intuition for this result is surprisingly similar to that in Section 7.3. First consider local prices. Given that n is large,
there is no return demand and so each ﬁrm’s local demand derives only from consumers that wish to purchase without
starting a non-local search. Via Distinctions 2 and 3, a rise in search costs deters consumers from starting to make a non-
local search and raises the optimal local price by an amount greater than that generated by a rise in switching costs.
Second, consider non-local prices. Each ﬁrm’s non-local demand derives from consumers that have started a non-local
search and then decided to stop. A rise in search costs deters consumers from pursuing further non-local searches and
raises the equilibrium non-local price, but an increase in switching costs has no such effect via Distinction 4. Finally, the
results on welfare again follow easily using similar arguments to those used in Proposition 6.
7.5. Switching without searching
Finally, in the vast majority of industries, it is clear that consumers will necessarily have to incur positive costs in
gathering and processing some information before switching suppliers. However, in some cases it may be possible for a
consumer to bypass any such activity by blindly switching to an alternative ﬁrm without ﬁrst knowing its price or
characteristics. For example, this possibility is discussed in Giulietti et al.’s (2010) study of search costs in the UK
electricity market where there are high levels of doorstep selling activity. The basic model can be shown to still apply in
such situations provided the level of search costs is sufﬁciently small as to ensure consumers still ﬁnd it optimal to search
before switching.17
8. Data application
As a secondary contribution, this ﬁnal section considers a data application. In the spirit of Shy’s (2002) ‘quick and easy’
method for calculating the level of switching costs, we show how one can use some conditions from the consumers’
optimal search to switch strategy together with aggregate consumer survey data to recover a set of ‘back of the envelope’
measures for both search costs and switching costs. While the model’s underlying assumptions are clearly restrictive in a
real-world context, the resulting empirical methodology is extremely simple and requires only minimal data. It is hoped
that further work may expand the current methodology to improve its generality and enable it to become a practical
measurement tool for competition authorities in the future. After presenting the methodology in Section 8.1, we provide
an example with data from eight different markets in 8.2 and discuss the methodology’s limitations in 8.3.
8.1. Methodology
The methodology is able to generate separate estimates for the two costs, bc and bs, as a proportion of the maximum
potential gains available from search, ðeeÞ. It makes use of two equilibrium conditions that link observable aggregate
consumer behaviour to the underlying levels of search and switching costs. The two conditions hold for any number of
ﬁrms larger than two and regardless of the market coverage assumption.18 First, the model predicts that consumers should
search beyond their local ﬁrm in equilibrium (where pi ¼ pn) if they receive a local match value lower than bxs. Hence, the
proportion of consumers who choose to search, denoted by a, should be described by the following equation:
a¼ GðbxsÞ ð11Þ
Second, provided there are more than two ﬁrms, the model suggests that consumers will switch after making exactly
one non-local search if they receive a local match value lower than bxs and discover a ﬁrst non-local offer exceeding bx.
Hence, the proportion of consumers who choose to switch after only one non-local search, b, should be described by the17 In particular, consider a market coverage equilibrium. From previous results we know a consumer will be indifferent over starting a non-local
search when eipn ¼ bxspn . Hence, the expected beneﬁt from searching can be considered equal to bxspn . The expected beneﬁt from switching to a
random alternative without searching equals EðeÞspn . Searching will be preferred when bx4EðeÞ or coðeeÞ=8.
18 Alternative equilibrium conditions can be used. However, most alternatives have the drawback of producing measures that require more data than
those derived below, being dependent upon the number of ﬁrms, the market coverage assumption and potentially, the equilibrium price.
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b¼ GðbxsÞ½1GðbxÞ ð12Þ
One can now use (11) and (12) to construct the two measures. As a ﬁrst step, b can be divided by a to suggest that the
fraction of searching consumers who are observed to switch after only one search, ðb=aÞ, equals 1GðbxÞ. Crucially, this
relationship is independent of the level of switching costs. This is because it refers to the extensiveness of search, which we
know is determined only by the level of search costs. Hence, by using ðb=aÞ ¼ 1GðbxÞwith the deﬁnition for the reservation
utility, bx ¼ e ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2cðeeÞp , one can construct a measure for search costs as a simple function of ðb=aÞ, (13). Intuitively, as ðb=aÞ
rises, the methodology proposes a relatively higher measure of search costs in order to explain why more searching
consumers stop after only one search:bc
ðeeÞ ¼ 0:5
b
a
 2
ð13Þ
Having constructed the measure of search costs for a given ðb=aÞ, a separate measure for switching costs can then be
derived by substituting bx ¼ eðeeÞðb=aÞ into (11) to give (14). Intuitively, the measure derives from the difference
between the actual proportion of consumers who do not search beyond their local ﬁrm, ð1aÞ ¼ 1GðbxsÞ, and the
predicted proportion that would not search if there were only search costs, 1GðbxÞ ¼ ðb=aÞ:bs
ðeeÞ ¼ ð1aÞ
b
a
 
ð14Þ
To calculate numerical values for the two measures for an actual market, one can then use aggregate survey data about
the levels of a and b. However, the interpretation of the measures will remain limited because the maximum gains from
search, ðeeÞ, are often unobservable. Therefore, it may be helpful to also calculate the ratio of the two measures in order
to obtain a scale-free estimate of the level of switching costs relative to search costs:
bsbc
 
¼
ð1aÞ b
a
 
0:5
b
a
 2 ð15Þ
Finally, it is useful to highlight the importance of accounting for both forms of friction separately within the methodology.
To illustrate, suppose a researcher falsely believes that search costs are negligible. The condition in (11) would then imply
that any consumer with a local match value lower than es will search, a¼ GðesÞ. This generates a ‘single-cost’ measure for
switching costs, bssing=ðeeÞ ¼ ð1aÞ. Unfortunately, this measure suffers from an upward bias, ðbssingbsÞ=ðeeÞ ¼ ðb=aÞ40,
because it falsely attributes all the observed inertia in consumers’ unwillingness to start searching to switching costs alone.
Now consider the parallel case where the researcher falsely believes s¼ 0. The proposed measure for search costs, bc in (13),
remains unbiased because it is based on the extensiveness of search which is independent of the level of switching costs.
However, the researcher may now be tempted to use a simpler, alternative measure instead. Using only the proportion of
searchers, a, the implied condition, a¼ GðbxÞ, generates a single-cost measure for search costs, bcsing=ðeeÞ ¼ ð1aÞ2=2. Yet, this
also suffers from an upward bias because it too falsely attributes all the observed consumer inertia to only one of the costs.
Due to the possibility of these biases, we conclude that any single-cost study that uses a related identiﬁcation strategy based
on the (un)willingness of consumers to search may offer misleading estimates. To avoid this, future studies should make
explicit account for both frictions or use an alternative identiﬁcation strategy. In the latter regard, measuring search costs
with the use of the extensiveness of search appears particularly promising.19
8.2. An example
As an example, the proposed measures are now calculated for eight different markets from the UK using responses from
a survey of 2027 consumers.20 If a consumer was active in the speciﬁed market, the survey asked (among other questions)
(i) whether the consumer had searched for an alternative supplier in the past three years, (ii) whether the consumer had
switched suppliers in the past three years, and (iii) if the consumer had switched within the last three years, how many
suppliers they searched beforehand. In our benchmark case, we employ the aggregate responses to these questions to
provide direct data on the proportions, a and b. The survey values and the resulting measures are presented in the ﬁrst ﬁve
columns of Table 1. However, this approach assumes that the relevant decision period over which the proportions a and b
should be measured is three years. In some markets, such as the market for mortgages, this may be appropriate.2119 Honka (2010) makes excellent progress in this direction. By identifying search costs with the use of more detailed data on the extensiveness of
individual’s search activity, she is able to report no bias in the search-cost-only version of her methodology to estimate search costs and switching costs
simultaneously.
20 The details and ﬁndings of the survey are provided in Chang and Waddams Price (2008).
21 The choice of a relevant decision period is also an issue within Kim et al. (2003) where switching costs are estimated using data on switching rates,
prices and costs within a market for bank loans. They use a three year period and provide additional market evidence to support this choice.
Table 1
Survey responses and estimated measures of search and switching costs.
Market a b bc
ðeeÞ
bs
ðeeÞ
bsbc
  bc1
ðeeÞ
bs1
ðeeÞ
bs1bc1
  bcsing
ðeeÞ
bssing
ðeeÞ
Electricity 0.306 0.016 0.001 0.642 469 0.001 0.846 619 0.241 0.694
Mobile phone 0.342 0.011 0.001 0.626 1210 0.001 0.854 1651 0.216 0.658
Fixed phone line rental 0.217 0.017 0.003 0.705 230 0.003 0.849 277 0.307 0.783
National and overseas calls 0.253 0.017 0.002 0.680 301 0.002 0.848 376 0.279 0.747
Broadband 0.491 0.016 0.001 0.476 897 0.001 0.804 1514 0.130 0.509
Car insurance 0.493 0.006 0.000 0.495 6682 0.000 0.823 11119 0.129 0.507
Mortgage 0.436 0.008 0.000 0.546 3241 0.000 0.836 4968 0.159 0.564
Current bank account 0.221 0.011 0.001 0.729 589 0.001 0.877 708 0.303 0.779
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therefore recalculate the measures in an alternative setting with a one-year decision period. These measures are denoted
by a subscript 1 and are computed by using a1 ¼ ða=3Þ and b1 ¼ ðb=3Þ under the assumption of constant search and
switching rates over the three year period. Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 also report the biased single-cost
measures, bcsing and bssing , as deﬁned in the last section (for the benchmark three-year decision period).
Several observations can be made. First, the results suggest that the ratio of switching costs to search costs in the
benchmark case, ðbs=bcÞ, is extremely high. Switching costs are calculated to be between 230 and 6682 times larger than
search costs. Indeed, while search costs are estimated to cover only 0.01–0.3% of the maximum gains from search,
switching costs cover 48–73% of the maximum gains available and are large enough to discourage the vast majority of
consumers from searching beyond their local ﬁrm. From the discussion above, these results derive from the small
proportion of searching consumers that switch after only one search, ðb=aÞ, which suggests search costs are low, and the
very large proportion of consumers that still refrain from any non-local search, a, which suggests switching costs are high.
Second, the relative size of switching costs is estimated to be even larger under the assumption of an annual decision
period, ðbs1=bc1Þ. Intuitively, the estimates of search costs remain unaffected because the fraction of searching consumers
who switch after only one search, ðb=aÞ, is independent of the chosen decision period. However, the proportion of
consumers who search, a, is lower under the annual assumption and the model explains this by raising the estimated level
of switching costs.
As detailed below, these initial estimates are open to many limitations. However, the ﬁnding that switching costs may
be so large relative to search costs does raise the possibility that authorities may prefer to lower switching costs rather
than search costs. While our previous theoretical results suggested that the marginal beneﬁts from a reduction in search
costs are often larger than those from a reduction in switching costs for any levels of the two costs, the overall net welfare
effects could be reversed if switching costs are sufﬁciently easier to reduce. Authorities should bear this point in mind
when making their policy decisions.
Finally, one can conﬁrm the potential upward bias of the single-cost measures, bcsing and bssing , by comparing them with
the estimated measures of the two costs, bc and bs. The bias is very pronounced in regard to the search cost measures
because they falsely include the more substantial effects of switching costs.8.3. Limitations
The ﬁnding that switching costs are larger than search costs does not seem inconsistent with the existing literature.22
However, the fact that we estimate switching costs to be so large relative to search costs is likely to be an indication of the
methodology’s limitations. Indeed, while the methodology provides a quick and simple method for measuring the two
costs separately, it clearly has many restrictive assumptions. It is hoped that further work can build on our initial work to
offer a more general estimation methodology for the future.
Some major limitations arise from the assumptions regarding consumers’ product valuations. First, the methodology
relies heavily on the unrealistic assumption that the product valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution. More
substantially, the methodology is also limited by the assumption that the product valuations are independently drawn
from an identical distribution. This implies that any excessive reluctance by consumers to search or switch away from a22 A very crude comparison of the magnitude of the two costs can be made by assessing the ﬁndings of single-cost studies in different markets. For
example, switching costs are estimated by Shy (2002) to be equal to $400–464 ($227–313) within the Finish bank market (Israeli cellular phone market),
and equal to $109–186 within the US television market by Shcherbakov (2009), while De los Santos et al. (forthcoming) estimate search costs of
$1.35 in the US online book market and Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2008) propose search costs of $2.21–12.26 for 70% of consumers in the
online market for memory chips. A much better comparison is provided by Honka’s (2010) unique study of both costs in the US auto insurance industry.
She ﬁnds switching costs of $85 and search costs of $45–110. However, her data is qualitatively different to ours with almost all consumers choosing to
search.
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explained by heterogeneous consumer preferences and yet, the methodology offers no account for this. A simple form of this
issue can be illustrated as follows. Suppose each consumer places an (unobserved) premium, g40, on their local ﬁrm i such
that ui ¼ gþeipi. This has no effect on the extensiveness of any search activity but consumers are nowmore reluctant to start
searching, with a¼ GðbxsgÞ. As a result, the methodology is then only able to compute ðsþgÞ=ðeeÞ ¼ ð1aÞðb=aÞ and
cannot separately identify the level of switching costs, s, from the preference parameter, g.23
More sophisticated methodologies are able to distinguish between market frictions and consumer heterogeneity using
more detailed data. Typically, in addition to data on ﬁrms’ prices and possibly, product characteristics, such studies employ
further data on individual consumer’s choices over time to estimate switching costs (e.g. Shcherbakov, 2009; Dube´ et al.,
2010) or extra data on consumers’ search histories to estimate search costs (e.g. Koulayev, 2010; De los Santos et al.,
forthcoming). To estimate the two costs simultaneously, Honka (2010) draws on a dataset with both these features.
However, like Shy’s (2002) single-cost study of switching costs, we are unable to account for consumer heterogeneity
because we base our estimates around a static model with (ex ante) identical consumers. Consequently, the current
methodology is likely to overestimate the levels of market friction, especially in regard to switching costs.
A further limitation from the use of a static model also arises from the implicit assumption that consumers are myopic.
Consumers only take into account current variables when making their decisions, while ignoring any future expected
differences between ﬁrms. Most empirical studies ignore these effects but Shcherbakov (2009) introduces forward-looking
consumers into his dynamic analysis of switching costs and shows that a myopic model would have underestimated the
level of switching costs. Incorporating such features into our methodology and into the wider literature would clearly be
useful for the future.
9. Conclusions
To help better understand and measure market frictions, this paper has offered a uniﬁed analysis of search costs and
switching costs. In its main contribution, the paper has documented the theoretical mechanisms by which the two
frictions can affect competition and welfare. Far from being equivalent, these mechanisms are so different that the effects
of the two costs can consistently differ in magnitude. Indeed, the paper has shown that, per unit, search costs are often the
more anti-competitive and welfare-damaging. While the optimal policy intervention will also depend upon the associated
resource costs, this suggests that, in response to the concerns about market frictions in markets such as those for banking
in Europe, the beneﬁts from reducing search costs may outweigh the beneﬁts from reducing switching costs.
As a secondary contribution, the paper has used insights from the theoretical model to construct separate empirical
measures for search costs and switching costs. It has also highlighted the importance of accounting for both frictions in
empirical work by showing how some ‘single-cost’ measures can exhibit an upward bias.
Overall, it is hoped that the paper may prompt researchers to think further about search costs and switching costs.
Empirically, we hope that future work will continue to develop more sophisticated estimation methodologies that account
for the existence of both costs. Theoretically, the ﬁnding that search costs are often particularly anti-competitive and
welfare-damaging underlines the importance of consumer search as an ongoing and increasingly active ﬁeld of study.
Finally, it is hoped that our results could also be extended to help explore the role of search costs and switching costs in
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Appendix A. Derivation of return demand
A consumer who is local to ﬁrm i will form part of ﬁrm i’s local return demand, (5), if she (i) starts to search from ﬁrm i,
(ii) chooses to search the entire market without optimally stopping, but then prefers to buy from ﬁrm i rather than (iii)
buying from any other ﬁrm or (iv) taking the outside option. This occurs with the probability that (i) eiobxsþpipn, (ii)
ejobx 8jai, (iii) eipiZejpns 8jai and (iv) eiZpi. As (ii) is non-binding, this probability can be expressed by23 In terms of the theoretical equilibrium more generally, one can check that the introduction of g raises the equilibrium price but leaves the main
comparative statics unchanged.
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maxfe ,pig Gðepiþp
nþsÞn1gðeÞ de. With simpliﬁcation, the use of the uniform assumption, and multiplying over ﬁrm i’s
ð1=nÞ local consumers, the ﬁrm’s local return demand can then be expressed by ð1=nðeeÞÞ Rbxmaxfe ,pigþpnpiþ s GðeÞn1de.
A consumer who is local to some ﬁrm jai will form part of ﬁrm i’s non-local return demand, (6), if she (i) starts to
search from ﬁrm j, and continues to search without stopping at (ii) ﬁrm i or (iii) any other ﬁrm kaj,i, but then prefers to
buy from ﬁrm i rather than (iv) buying from ﬁrm j, (v) buying from any ﬁrm k or (vi) taking the outside option. This occurs
with the probability that (i) ejobxs, (ii) eiobxþpipn, (iii) ekobx 8kai,j, (iv) eipisZejpn, (v) eipisZekpns 8kai,j
and (vi) eiZpiþs. Conditions (i) and (iii) are non-binding. Further, by rewriting (iv) as ejreipiþpns, observe that the
probability that condition (iv) is met is zero unless eiZeþpipnþs and so with this further condition, the total probability
can then be expressed by
Rbxþpipn
maxfpi þ s,eþpipnþ sg Gðepiþp
nsÞGðepiþpnÞn2gðeÞ de. With simpliﬁcation, the use of the
uniform assumption and multiplying over the ððn1Þ=nÞ consumers that are not local to ﬁrm i, ﬁrm i’s non-local return
demand can be expressed by ½ðn1Þ=n½1=ðeeÞ Rbxmaxfe ,pngþ s GðeÞn2GðesÞ de.
Appendix B. Equilibrium existence
The existence of equilibrium is difﬁcult to fully demonstrate in models such as these due to potential kinks in demand
which can prevent proﬁt functions from being globally concave. See Christou and Vettas (2008) for a technical discussion
within a related model of informative advertising. Indeed, in our context, the expressions for the components of residual
demand, presented in (3)–(6), are only valid if 9pipn9 is not too large. In particular, equations (3)–(6) are only valid for
pi 2 ½pB ¼ pnþeðbxsÞ,pT ¼ pnþebx. If piopB, none of ﬁrm i’s local consumers will wish to make a non-local search and so
ﬁrm i’s local fresh demand becomes equal to ð1=nÞ and its local return demand must equal zero. If pi4pT , any non-local
consumer who visits ﬁrm i will never wish to stop, such that ﬁrm i’s non-local fresh demand becomes equal to zero and its
non-local return demand must be re-expressed. Further kinks will also be present at the more extreme prices,
p^B ¼ pnþebx and p^T ¼ pnþeðbxsÞ. Consequently, a general proof of existence appears intractable in this model but
existence can be demonstrated within the special case where s-0. Here, the model collapses to some standard search
models and so we can apply previous results. When pnoe existence is demonstrated by Anderson and Renault (1999).
When pn4e, although Wolinsky (1986) did not consider such kinks, Armstrong et al. (2009) prove existence in the special
case of a standard uniform match distribution.
Appendix C. Proofs of PropositionsProof of Proposition 1. When a symmetric equilibrium exists, the equilibrium price must form a solution to the necessary
ﬁrst order condition, pn ¼Diðpn,pnÞ=D0iðpn,pnÞ. To see that the price in Proposition 1 follows directly from this condition,
ﬁrst note
Pn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk ¼ ð1GðbxÞn1Þ=ð1GðbxÞÞ. Using this and (3)–(6), then note that when evaluated at pi ¼ pn, (i) Diðpi,pnÞ
in (2), implies Diðpn,pnÞ ¼ ð1=nÞ½1Gðmaxfe,pngÞGðmaxfe,pngþsÞn1 and (ii) D0iðpi,pnÞ implies D0iðpn,pnÞ ¼ ð1=ðnðeeÞÞ
½1þGðbxsÞPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkIðpnreÞGðeþsÞn1. Further, for any symmetric equilibrium to exist, a solution to the ﬁrst order
condition must lie within pn 2 ½0,bxsÞ as Condition 1 implies pnobxs. Conditional on the existence of such a solution, the
equilibrium price is unique. This is most easily observed if one rearranges the FOC as ðpn=Diðpn,pnÞÞ ¼D0iðpn,pnÞ and notes
that the left-hand side is independent of bx while the right-side is strictly increasing in bx for all bxs 2 ðe,eÞ, which is ensured
via Condition 1 so long as either c40 or s40.
Proof of Proposition 2. We will ﬁrst show that @pn=@c40 for all nZ2. Using (9) and denoting pnNC as p
n for convenience,
deﬁne H¼ ðpn=ðeeÞÞ½1þGðbxsÞPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkÞ½1GðpnÞGðpnþsÞðn1Þ ¼ 0. From the implicit function theorem, @pn=@c¼
ð@H=@cÞ=ð@H=@pÞ. Under our assumptions with non-market coverage, eopnobxsre, one can show that @H=@p40.
Therefore the sign of @pn=@c depends on the sign of @H=@c¼ðpn=ðeeÞÞ½GðbxsÞ  ð@Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk=@cÞþPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk
ð@GðbxsÞ=@cÞ, or equivalently, ðpn=ðeeÞ2Þ½GðbxsÞPn2k ¼ 0 kGðbxÞk1þPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkð@bx=@cÞ. This is positive for all nZ2 as
@bx=@c¼ðeeÞ=ðebxÞÞo0. Finally, we will now show that @pnNC=@s40 for all n42, and for n¼ 2 if e40. From above, we
know that the sign of @pn=@s depends on the sign of @H=@s¼ðpn=ðeeÞÞ½Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk  ð@GðbxsÞ=@sÞþ½@ð1GðpnÞ
GðpnþsÞn1Þ=@s or equivalently, ðeeÞ1½ðpn=ðeeÞÞPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkGðpnÞðn1ÞGðpnþsÞn2. We will now show that this is
zero when n¼ 2 and e ¼ 0, but positive for all other valid parameters. First, compare the terms ðpn=ðeeÞÞ and GðpnÞ. As
GðpnÞ can be written as ðpneÞ=ðeeÞ, note that ðpn=ðeeÞÞ ¼ GðpnÞ when e ¼ 0 and ðpn=ðeeÞÞ4GðpnÞ when e40. Now
compare the remaining terms
Pn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk and ðn1ÞGðpnþsÞðn2Þ, and note that Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk ¼ ðn1ÞGðpnþsÞðn2Þ when
n¼ 2 and Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk4ðn1ÞGðpnþsÞðn2Þ when n42 because GðbxÞ4GðpnþsÞ.
Proof of Proposition 3. Denoting pnNC as p
n, we want to demonstrate that ð@pn=@cÞð@pn=@sÞ40. Using the logic
and results from Proposition 2, this requires ð@H=@cÞð@H=@sÞ40. With some rearrangement of the expressions
above, this condition holds if ðpn=ðeeÞÞ½GðbxsÞ ð@Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk=@cÞðpn=ðeeÞÞ½Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk ðð@GðbxsÞ=@cÞð@GðbxsÞ=@sÞÞ
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ðð@bx=@cÞþ1Þþðn1ÞGðpnÞGðpnþsÞðn2Þ40. This is true for all n as ð@bx=@cÞ ¼ ðeeÞ=ðebxÞÞo1.
Proof of Proposition 4. To show that the price under market coverage, (8), is increasing in c, note that @ð1=pnCÞ=@c¼
ðeeÞ2ð@bx=@cÞ½Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkþGðbxsÞPn2k ¼ 0 kGðbxÞk1. Under the assumptions with market coverage, pnCreobxsre, this is
negative for all nZ2 because @bx=@c¼ðeeÞ=ðebxÞÞo0.To show that the price is also increasing in s, note that
@ð1=pnCÞ=@s¼ðeeÞ2½
Pn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkþðn1ÞGðeþsÞn2 is negative for all nZ2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Deﬁne A¼ @ð1=pnCÞ=@c@ð1=pnCÞ=@s. Search (switching) costs will have the larger relative marginal
effect if A is negative (positive). By rearranging the expressions from the proof of Proposition 4, A can be presented as
follows.
A  ðeeÞ2 ¼ GðbxsÞXn2
k ¼ 0 kGðbxÞk1  @bx@c
 
þ
Xn2
k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk  @bx@c þ1
 
þðn1ÞGðeþsÞn2
By using a series of steps, we will now show that Ao0 for all ‘valid’ parameters whenever nZ4. Valid parameters are
deﬁned as those that are consistent with the model’s assumptions under market coverage, such that pnCreobxsre.
Step 1. As ð@bx=@cÞo0, it is trivial to show that @A=@s40. Further, we know that in any valid set of parameters, sobxe.
Therefore, A will always be less than A
s ¼bxe for all valid values of s, where As ¼bxe  ðeeÞ2 ¼ Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk ðð@bx=@cÞþ1Þþ
ðn1ÞGðbxÞn2. Therefore, to demonstrate that Ao0 for all nZ4, we now only need to show that A
s ¼bxer0 for all nZ4. We
proceed to show that this is true for two exhaustive cases (i) when bx4 ðeþeÞ=2 in Step 2 and (ii) bxr ðeþeÞ=2 in Step 3.
Step 2. Let bx4ðeþeÞ=2. It then follows that ðð@bx=@cÞþ1Þ ¼ðbxeÞ=ðebxÞo1. As Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞkZ ðn1ÞGðbxÞn2, we then
know that A
s ¼bxer0 for all n.
Step 3. Now let bxrðeþeÞ=2.
Step 3a. It can be shown that A
s ¼bxe is decreasing in n if GðbxÞoeð1=ðn1ÞÞ. To see this, note that the ﬁrst term of As ¼bxe is
clearly decreasing in n as ðð@bx=@cÞþ1Þo0 and that the second term is also decreasing in nwhen @ðn1ÞGðbxÞn2=@n¼ GðbxÞn2
½1þðn1ÞlnGðbxÞo0.
Step 3b. It then follows that A
s ¼bxe is decreasing in n for all nZ4. To see this, note that the condition GðbxÞoeð1=ðn1ÞÞ
becomes easier to satisfy as n increases. Thus, if it holds for n¼ 4 it will hold for all nZ4. When n¼ 4, it is indeed satisﬁed
because we know that GðbxÞr0:5 for all bxrðeþeÞ=2 and that eð1=3Þ40:71.
Step 3c. Finally, as we now know that A
s ¼bxe is decreasing in n for all nZ4, to ensure that A remains negative for all
nZ4 we need only show that A
s ¼bxer0 when n¼ 4. With simpliﬁcation, we therefore require As ¼bxe ,n ¼ 4  ðeeÞ2 ¼
½1þGðbxÞþGðbxÞ2 ½ð@bx=@cÞþ1þ3GðbxÞ2r0 for all bx 2 ðe,ðeþeÞ=2. This can be shown to be true most easily by rewriting
ð@bx=@cÞþ1¼ðbxeÞ=ðebxÞ as GðbxÞ=ð1GðbxÞÞ, such that A
s ¼bxe ,n ¼ 4  ðeeÞ2 ¼½GðbxÞ=ð1GðbxÞÞ½4GðbxÞ22GðbxÞþ1 which is
negative for all GðbxÞ 2 ð0,0:5.
Proof of Proposition 6. Following from the explanation of Proposition 6 in the text, it only remains to show that the
aggregate number of non-local searches, Kc , is larger than the total number of switches, Ks, in equilibrium. If no1, we
know this is true because (i) switching consumers switch only once, (ii) all switchers must conduct at least one non-local
search and (iii) a positive proportion of consumers search beyond their local ﬁrm yet decide not to switch. This latter
proportion equals the market level of local return demand, nRLiðpn,pnÞ, which from (5), equals ðeeÞ1
Rbx
maxfe ,pngþ s
GðeÞn1de40. If n¼1, all return demand tends to zero as all searching consumers eventually ﬁnd an attractive offer
and switch. Hence, the proportion of consumers who search then equals the proportion of consumers who switch.
However, we know that, on average, each searching consumer conducts more than one search. Indeed, the average number
of searches made by a searching consumer equals ð1GðbxÞÞ½1þ2GðbxÞþ3GðbxÞ2 . . . þðn1ÞGðbxÞn2þðn1ÞGðbxÞn1 or equiva-
lently,
Pn2
k ¼ 0
GðbxÞk, which is greater than one when n¼1 if bx4e, as ensured via Condition 1.
Proof of Proposition 7. To avoid a monopoly price equilibrium, we must assume that some non-local search takes place
which now requires maxf0,epn1gobxspn2. Given n-1, there is no return demand. Therefore, as all consumers are local
to Firm 1, its demand derives solely from the consumers that are unwilling to start a non-local search. Given a price at Firm
1, p1, and a correct expectation of a non-local price, p
n
2, it follows that D1ðp1,pn2Þ ¼ 1Gðbxsþp1pn2Þ. Now consider the
ðn1Þ entrants who have no local consumers. Their demand can only result from the Gðbxsþpn1pn2Þ consumers who start a
search from Firm 1. Such consumers will visit any given entrant ﬁrm, say Firm 2, with probability, ð1=ðn1ÞÞPn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk,
and ﬁnd it optimal to stop at Firm 2 with probability, 1Gðbxþp2pn2Þ, such that D2ðp2; pn1,pn2Þ ¼ Gðbxsþpn1pn2Þ ½1=ðn1Þ
½Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk  ½1Gðbxþp2pn2Þ. After stating the incumbent and entrant proﬁt maximisation problems and simultaneously
solving the two ﬁrst order conditions, it follows that pn1 ¼ ebxþðs=2Þ and pn2 ¼ ebx. From the assumption that some
C.M. Wilson / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 1070–10861086consumers search in equilibrium, maxf0,epn1gobxspn2, we know that bx4eþðs=2Þ. This, together with c40, then
ensures that @pni =@c4@p
n
i =@s for i¼ 1;2. By noting that industry proﬁts,P, equal pn1D1ðpn1,pn2Þþpn2½1D1ðpn1,pn2Þ, one can then
further show @P=@c4@P=@s. Finally, using similar arguments to that used in Proposition 6, one can demonstrate that the
results for total welfare and consumer surplus follow for c40 if the total number of searches, Kc , exceeds the total number
of switches, Ks. Here, this is ensured as the average switcher conducts ½1=ð1GðbxÞÞ41 searches.
Proof of Proposition 8. To avoid a monopoly price equilibrium, we must assume that some non-local search takes place
which now requires maxf0,epnLgobxspnNL. Given n-1, there is no return demand. Consider any ﬁrm i. Its ai local
consumers can buy at its local price, piL. However, such consumers will only buy if they do not initiate a non-local search.
Given a correct expectation of the non-local price, pnNL, ﬁrm i’s local demand will then equal DiLðpiL,pnNLÞ ¼ ai½1G
ðbxsþpiLpnNLÞ. Now consider ﬁrm i’s non-local demand. Any of the ð1aiÞ consumers that are not local to Firm i can buy
from ﬁrm i at the price, piNL. Such consumers will start to search beyond their own local ﬁrm with probability,
GðbxsþpnLpnNLÞ, visit ﬁrm i with probability, Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk, and ﬁnd it optimal to stop at ﬁrm i with probability,
1GðbxþpiNLpnNLÞ, such that DiNLðpiNL; pnNL,pnL Þ ¼ ð1aiÞ  GðbxsþpnLpnNLÞ Pn2k ¼ 0 GðbxÞk  ½1GðbxþpiNLpnNLÞ. Firm i’s proﬁts
are then equal to piLDiLð:ÞþpiNLDiNLð:Þ. After stating the associated maximisation problem and simultaneously solving the
two ﬁrst order conditions, it follows that pnL ¼ ebxþðs=2Þ and pnNL ¼ ebx. From the assumption that some consumers search
in equilibrium, maxf0,epnLgobxspnNL, we know that bx4eþðs=2Þ. This, together with c40, then ensures that
@pnL=@c4@p
n
L=@s and @p
n
NL=@c4@p
n
NL=@s. By noting that industry proﬁts, P, equal p
n
L 
Pn
i ¼ 1 aiDiLðpnL ,pnNLÞþpnNL  ð1
Pn
i ¼ 1 ai
DiLðpnL ,pnNLÞÞ, one can further show @P=@c4@P=@s. Finally, using similar arguments to that used in Proposition 6, one can
show that the results for total welfare and consumer surplus follow for c40 if the total number of searches, Kc , exceeds
the total number of switches, Ks. Here, this is ensured as the average switcher conducts ½1=ð1GðbxÞÞ41 searches.
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